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Introduction 
Democracy is often perceived as another word for good government. 
For several Western observers, recent democratization drives signal 
the inevitable advancement of political civilization. Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) predicted the end of history1, in the sense that democracy was 
the last station on the long, progressive journey towards moderniza- 
tion. In his view, democracy was the highest and final form of 
human government. How democracy "happens" has long been a 
question of concern in the social sciences. An American writer of 
great influence, Samuel Huntington, stated in his seminal work The 
Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991) that 
democracy has arrived in different parts of the world in waves. 
Huntington acknowledges that "history is messy and political 
changes do not sort themselves into neat historical boxe~",~ and he 
also stresses that history has never been unidirectional. Nevertheless 
he maintains that it is possible to identify three waves of democra- 
tization in the modern world, the first two waves followed by 
reverse waves. The first wave of regime changes came between 1828 
and 1926. Then the development reversed between 1922 and 1942. 
The second wave was shorter and occurred between 1943 and 1962. 
The period between 1958 and 1975 was characterized by a reverse 
wave. In the 1970s a third wave appeared in Southern Europe and 
then in Latin America; democratic forces swept away more or less 
authoritarian, rightist regimes. In the late 1980s South Korea and 
Taiwan initiated their democratic transformation. It was in that 
period that socialist regimes were also hit by the wave, in China 
with what Western observers optimistically term a temporary 
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set-back. In Europe, however, self-declared socialist regimes lost 
what remained of their legitimacy, and, mostly by peaceful means, 
the old orthodox elites were forced to retreat. 
Huntington is neither unidimensional nor dogmatic. His waves 
are explained with a breathtaking variety of variables and complex 
interdependent relations. After discussing theories that have been 
advanced to explain democratization, he draws the following 
conclusions: 
that a single factor is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain 
democracy; 
that one has to consider a combination of causes, and that this 
combination varies from country to country; 
e that the causes responsible for one wave are likely to be different 
in another wave.3 
Despite these provisos which safeguard his approach, Huntington 
does reveal where his sympathies lie when he states that "Economic 
development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes 
it real."4 ~ n d  in the concluding paragraph of his book he asserts, that 
Buoyed by a rising tide of economic progress, each wave advanced 
further and ebbed less than its predecessor. History, to shift the 
metaphor, does not move forward in a straight line, but when 
skilled and determined leaders push, it does move f~ rward .~  
In this optimistic conclusion - or wishful prophecy - Huntington 
sides with Fukuyam in his view of development and modernization 
as forces bringing the countries of the world steadily closer to the 
political goal that everybody supposedly hopes for and some also 
fight for: good government which ultimately is democracy. Even if 
Huntington underlines variety in terms of the "why" and "how" of 
democracy and democratization, his treatment of cultural causes or 
obstacles in politics seems somewhat restricted. Having discussed 
the impact of Confucianism in East Asia, he concludes that "Confu- 
cian democracy is clearly a contradiction in  term^".^ 
Later on, however, both Huntington and Fukuyama, together with 
an increasing number of political observers and scholars, became 
hesitant about their initial "optimistic" and Western-oriented views. 
In their later works they have presented more differentiated views 
(Fukuyama 1995; Huntington 1996). To both of them, culture - basic- 
ally understood as fundamental values and norms - is more impor- 
tant in defining the characteristics of a society than they initially 
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realized, and this seems linked to recent developments in and 
discussions about democracy in East and Southeast Asia. In the light 
of the economic successes and the particular history of this region, 
the "wave ideology" and the historical perspectives that go with it 
seem unbearably eurocentric. This is not to imply that there is one 
common culture in all East and Southeast Asia, or that Asians are 
guided by culture while we are not. Rather, that culture, as an 
intangible phenomenon which grounds a person in their commu- 
nity, makes a great difference everywhere, although this is usually 
only acknowledged when the culture differs from that of the 
observer. 
In this article, waves - as Huntington uses the term - are acknow- 
ledged as depicting observable political occurrences; democratiza- 
tion processes can be observed and democracies can be counted. 
However, the bombastic statement that Confucian democracy is a 
contradiction in terms will be challenged. To this end the concept 
undercurrent is introduced. Undercurrents depict relatively steady 
phenomena such as ideas and perceptions acquired through primary 
and secondary socialization, considered important in determining 
gradual and durable developments. This implies that, even if 
political ideologies and strategies change, developments in the real 
world are still greatly affected by the generally accepted values and 
norms among people. 
The normative orientation of people does change, however, but 
not in waves. Normative orientation is probably much more 
connected to feelings and notions developed out of lived experience, 
than to rational choices based on ideological thinking or economic 
calculations. In East Asia, the cultural undercurrent plays a crucial 
role, and due to current developments in the region, Western waves 
may already have met the counterforce of this undercurrent. After 
the ideologically rationalized superpower conflict, Huntington 
(1993) sees the present world as threatened by conflicts between 
civilizations. Disagreements concerning democracy may not be the 
only reason for possible violent conflicts. It may, on the other hand, 
undermine that element of trust between people and nations that is 
deemed necessary to maintain and expand international under- 
standing and stability. 
I shall attempt to substantiate the general discussion with results 
from three surveys conducted in Korea in 1989, 1990 and 1995 with 
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the aim of analyzing attitudes of urban middle-class Koreans, mainly 
intellectuals. These surveys investigate current views on politics as 
well as values that are thought to function as guidelines for the 
respondents' views in the political sphere. The current views may 
well reflect waves coming from outside, while the respondents' basic 
values are of the kind that provide continuity to Korean politics, 
despite economic miracles and democratic waves. Future political 
scenarios will be seen in the light of the survey findings. Initially, 
however, the general approach of the essay and some central aspects 
related to the issue will be discussed. 
Particularity or Universality? 
It seems reasonable that the point of departure in analyzing whether 
a political system is democratic must be a definition of democracy. 
One has to know what one is looking for. There is no consensus, 
however, on a basic definition of democracy, only several contesting 
schools - and a lot of disagreement concerning the scope of the 
concept. In addition to the problem of universalist versus relativist, 
one has constitutionalist versus practitionalist (those who see politics 
as a practical human activity); liberalists versus those stressing 
participatory democracy; and, in the same vein, government 
perspectives versus grassroots perspectives. According to David 
Held (1992) these contradictions are, to a large extent, artificial. The 
different approaches focus on different levels in the policy and the 
one cannot therefore supersede the other. To some extent the 
emphasis of the different schools or approaches in studying 
democracy may reflect political ideals more than scientific results, 
and they often "bypass the necessary work of theoretical analysis".' 
Going back to the root of the concept, democracy means a form of 
government in which the people, and not monarchs or aristocracies, 
rulea8 This broad description raises a host of questions about the role 
of government, the meaning of rule, and the range of the concept 
people. And obviously, each answer raises new questions. Still, the 
debate about definitions of democracy is outside the scope of this 
essay, where Held's description must suffice. Democracy as people's 
power may be a broad characterization and far from a scientific 
definition: nevertheless, it might be exactly what makes sense to 
people, even inside academic circles. 
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I Internationally the most celebrated version of democracy is the 
I 
1 liberal model, "a multi-party representational democracy"9 "based on 
I parliamentary institutions, coupled to the free market system in the 
I area of economic production".10 Since the Second World War and 
until recently, the concept liberal has in one way or another been part 
I of the name of the Korean ruling party. 
I In 1989 I conducted a pilot survey combined with in-depth inter- 
views with government officials, party officials, journalists, school 
, teachers, university professors, university administrative staff and 
students in ~eou1.l' In response to the question: "What does democracy 
mean to you?", the only common denominator was that it meant 
anything but military dictatorship. This negative conception of 
democracy signalled that it might be a good idea to study democracy 
in relation to culture, instead of searching for a fixed pattern of 
democratic attributes based on ideological preferences or a strict 
(theoretical) definition. This notion was tested in a multiple choice 
questionnaire by listing eight attributes that were found in the above- 
mentioned interviews to be connected with democracy. The eight 
attributes are listed below according to their rank as first choice:12 
Table 1: Attributes of democracy 





Equilibrium between rights and duties 
Freedom of exmession 
It may be difficult to see a clear pattern in the list above. Based on 
the interviews conducted in the same period, and several informal 
discussions with people belonging to the relevant target group, an 
outline can nevertheless be sketched combining statements of 1, 3, 5 
and 7 to form a majority of 58 per cent. The first statement expresses 
the wish for a society with fewer socially based privileges, and less 
economic and political corruption. This was a point of view pre- 
18 % 
14 % 
Rights of underprivileged people 
Total political freedom 
Social security 
Freedom to organize 
4% 
4 %  
3 %  
0 %  
Key: N=226 
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valent at the time of the survey. Combined with the third statement 
defining democracy in terms of a balance between rights and duties, 
it seems safe to claim that at least half of the respondents perceive 
democracy within a moral perspective. Statements 5 and 7 can 
probably be added to the two already mentioned, which strengthen 
the moral (or communal) perception of democracy. The other 
position, which seems somewhat closer to a Western liberal, insti- 
tutional definition of democracy, is expressed by the statements 2,4 
and 6. It is striking that not a single respondent picked statement 8, 
freedom to organize,13 as the first priority. After all, at the time of the 
survey, this made up one of the main areas of conflict involving not 
only government versus dissident forces and industrial workers; but 
also, journalists and school teachers, two of the target groups in the 
survey. If a conclusion is to be drawn, it must be that the respon- 
dents do have opinions about democracy (only 5 per cent marked 
"something else/dontt know"); and that they seem to be divided into 
two groups, of which the majority appears to be affected by a moral 
attitude linked to Korea's indigenous political culture. 
The 1990 survey,14 repeated in 1995,15 sought to investigate per- 
ceptions of democracy in a more extensive way, in relation to a 
generalized Western liberal model as well as in relation to basic 
aspects of the indigenous political culture. Normally when designing 
a questionnaire for measuring attitudes, the recommended approach 
is to formulate questions that can describe differences of opinions 
among the respondents. Thus, researchers seek to avoid statements 
that most of the respondents tend either to agree with or to disagree 
with completely. In the present study this was not the intention since 
an important objective was to identify consensual as well as 
controversial issues. 
The questionnaire presented sixty-six statements divided into five 
sections, according to the subject matter which covered: democracy; 
political culture; upbringing and education; political leadership; 
organizations and political parties; and finally, the divided country. 
The statements presented in each of these sections reflected public 
debates in the media, current political controversial issues, govern- 
ment propaganda, aspects of the school curriculum, student 
demands, and opposition allegations. The statements selected to be 
used in the questionnaire were first tested in qualitative interviews 
with people representing the target groups of the two surveys. 
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Finally Korean colleagues tested the questionnaire in a small-scale 
pilot study, analysed the data, and suggested small adjustments to 
clarify the statements. 
I 
Table 2: Statements concerning general properties of democracy 
(Response in % agreement) 
interests and therefore also conflicts. 
Key: 1990: N=500; 1995: N=838 
It seems clear from table 2 that an overwhelming majority of the 
respondents support aspects of democracy generally believed to 
characterize the liberal forms of that system. Popular participation, 
including party pluralism and a free contest for public office, is 
accepted with no restriction. Conflicting interests are seen as a 
natural part of the political process. This includes the acceptance of 
dissidents, who up until now have been perceived as political 
outcasts. Moreover human rights are perceived to be a prerequisite 
for a democratic political system. All the statements that are 
presented in table 2 as requirements for democracy can be found in 
modern liberal definitions of that concept.16 The current democratic 
wave may have affected this group of respondents - or, placing them 
in the active role, they may be seen as participants in creating the 
wave. Based on the response to the statements in table 3, it is 
tempting to assume that fundamental aspects of democracy do cross 
cultural frontiers. But before assuming this, one has to test whether 
cultural particularities, the undercurrents, make a difference or not. 
In table 2 attributes linked to current problems on the Korean 
political scene as well as characteristics associated with traditional 
Korean society are presented. A number of these attributes may also 
be found in other political systems in other political cultures, but as a 
package they characterize current political culture in Korea. 
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Table 3: Statements concerning properties of Korean political 
culture (Response in % agreement) 
Statement 
The electorate in South Korea is familiar with the programme 
and ideologies of the political parties. 
Our political parties are not so much communities of members 
who have the same ideas as gatherings for political leaders. 
A group of people without a leader means chaos. 
Good morals and a humanistic attitude are the most important 
qualities in politics. 
Our traditional respect for great leaders still affects our 
perception of politics and s&iety. 
The objective of democracy is harmonious social relations. 
The ideal society is like a family. 
Key: 1990: N=500; 1995: N=838 
The first and second statements in table 3 concentrate on political 
parties, and it appears that the respondents see party pluralism as a 
cover-up for ambitious leaders. Instead of seeing this as a failure in 
relation to ideal (Western) democratic ideas, it can also be examined 
in relation to the ensuing five statements in table 3. In this context, 
the greater importance of personal leaders in relation to institutional 
frameworks makes much more sense, especially in the light of an 
apparently strong conviction among the respondents that society is 
the ideal family expanded. Just as in the family, they cherish 
harmonious relations as an ideal for the whole society. In brief, 
tables 2 and 3 form two different contexts for discussing democracy. 
One crucial question attached to this is: which of the two contexts is 
the most relevant? 
The specific features underpinning ideas about politics and 
governments are interesting if they reveal why a particular political 
system in a particular country develops in a particular way. To quote 
Fred Inglis: 
"Particularity": that is the great, the crucial word. By our differences 
shall we know ourselves, not only because the human faculty of 
differentiation is what makes understanding possible, in how we 
see as in how we talk, but also because having identified and 
celebrated the differences, the remainder is what is commonly 
human. It is the human world, and the ground of solidarity and 
survival.17 
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The special, the particular, the aspects that make a difference, are not 
focused upon in order to accentuate discord, but to celebrate variety 
as well as sameness. Nothing but understanding can possibly bridge 
I the existing cross-cultural distance between values and ideas. And in 
particular, by identifying the differences, we might even come to 
I know ourselves a little better. In short, to establish a universal 
I understanding of democracy, the great variety of existing democracies, 
, "Western", "Asian", and others, must be taken into consideration. A 
fundamental problem is, however, embedded here: so-called 
1 objective judgement of human relations seems to be a contradiction 
in terms. Relations between subjects is left for subjective evaluations. 
What we usually are left with in judging social relations is a 
generalized subjective opinion. The universal dimension of this is 
the necessity of relativism in cross-cultural encounters. he difficulty 
of realizing this in a cross-cultural environment is immense, which 
may be illustrated in the following. 
Back in the 1940s, just before the end of the Second World War, 
Ruth Benedict attacked the "protagonists" of "One World" who 
believed that all mankind was like-minded. She wondered 
why believing in the brotherhood of man should mean that one 
cannot say that the Japanese have their own version of the conduct 
of life and that Americans have theirs. It sometimes seems as if the 
tender-minded could not base a doctrine of good will upon 
anything less than a world of peoples, each of which is a print from 
the same negatives? 
Even though Benedict expresses a healthy open-mindedness 
concerning ways of life, this view did not affect her vision of the 
future Japanese "de-mok-ra-sie" a concept coined by Benedict. The 
Japanese, she said, "have denied themselves simple freedoms which 
Americans count upon as unquestioningly as the air they breathe". 
She emphasizes this by claiming that to them (the Japanese), it can 
be highly intoxicating (her concept again) "to act quite simply and 
innocently as one pleases".19 She knows the remedy, though: the 
Nisei, the second-generation Japanese born in the US, have "lost the 
knowledge and practice of the Japanese code. So too, the Japanese in 
Japan can, in a new era, set up a way of life which does not demand 
the old requirements of individual restraintw.*' Freedom is here 
perceived as individual freedom, as something unquestionably good 
which traditional traits may prevent from being developed. 
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Half a century later, looking with hindsight at "the new Japanese", 
or "the new  orea an"^' for that matter, is this person fundamentally 
different from those of the pre-war generations? Do the post-war 
generations cherish individual freedom, as do their blood-related 
brothers and sisters living in the West? Has "de-mok-ra-sie" matured 
into democracy, in the sense that it permits or rather bases itself on 
individual freedom? Several factors indicate otherwise, as has been 
discussed above. Even if democracy is celebrated as the preferred 
political system by the Korean respondents in the 1990 and 1995 
surveys referred to above, the same groups of respondents may 
perfectly well decline the liberal part of it, sticking to the family as 
the common denominator. 
The perception of individual freedom as a touchstone for liberal- 
ism may in fact hardly be shared outside the Western hemisphere. If 
this is so, it must affect the form of democracy that non-Western 
countries seek to realize. If individual freedom as a fundamental 
premise in Western liberal democracy has a different connotation in 
a non-Western context, the whole idea of third-wave democracy 
should perhaps be treated differently, especially in East Asia. Why 
this has not yet happened will be discussed below. 
Western Centrism as a Barrier for Genuine Universalism 
The arguments above can be boiled down to one basic assumption: 
In a world characterized by a multitude of cultures, it is highly 
problematic to establish an a priori concept of universal democracy 
as the starting point in studies of democratization. Unfortunately, to 
realize that this problem exists does not point to a simple solution. In 
debates concerning the importance of culture for the formation of 
political systems, it is hard to find a middle ground, a platform so to 
speak, from which it can be decided how important culture actually 
is. One obvious reason is that advocates of the different positions 
often belong to different cultural spheres. Recently, this has been 
clearly demonstrated in debates about democracy from a Western 
"universalist" versus an Asian "cultural relativist" perspective. This 
geographically labelled conceptual conflict notwithstanding, a 
claimed universalism has for a long time been the dominant approach 
of social sciences in the West as well as in most Asian countries. 
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An implicit assumption in the Western version of universalism is 
that the present and the future exceed the past along some desirable, 
progressive line of development. Inherent in this developmental 
state of mind is the belief that technological improvement is essential 
to the fulfilment and maintenance of an acceptable standard of life 
on this planet. The ideology underpinning our technologically 
oriented societies is perceived to be extremely easily transferred 
from one culture to another. In this respect the West is characterized 
by a missionary zeal for exporting their ideology globally.22 It is not 
an exaggeration to claim that when it comes to technology, and to 
the idealization of this product of human creativity, East Asia has 
been a fertile soil. Other aspects of Western universalism may also 
have been enthusiastically received, but less easily absorbed in the 
given cultural context. 
Contrary to the Western idea of history as a linear, progressive 
development, where the past is left in favour of the future, a circular 
perception of history prevails in East Asia. The circular notion 
implies a strong sense of continuity, linking the past, the present and 
the future. This continuity has traditionally been perceived as one of 
the principal guarantors of social stability. "The genius of Confucius 
was directed precisely toward understanding and articulating the 
value of tradition as the source and foundation of society and 
culture."23 From a Western point of view this has been a proof of East 
Asian conservatism or traditionalism; in effect a sort of outdated 
culturalism. In the wake of the Second World War, this was even the 
conventional truth among a majority of the East Asian elite. 
Following the successful economic development and a related politi- 
cal self-consciousness, however, some Asian leaders, together with a 
growing number of intellectuals, are increasingly questioning the 
Western claim to have developed the best possible model for good 
government. 24 
The post-Cold War international climate has made way for East- 
West exchanges of views concerning democracy and human rights 
in a virtual ping-pong game. Western governments and non- 
governmental organizations criticize Asian regimes in unison for 
their failure to secure the individual from arbitrary infringement by 
forces related to or commanded by state authorities. Asian leaders 
generally rcjcct this critique fiercely as misplaced interference in 
internal affairs, and often they mobilize culture in defence of their 
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positions. Moreover counter-attacks are frequently made by pointing 
at a broad spectrum of problems in Western countries, such as: 
divided families, drug abuse, ''junk" entertainment, violence and 
criminal activities, unemployment, and widespread egocentrism and 
consumerism as a general substitute for higher, more worthy goals 
in life. The Western response to this is generally as follows: even if 
your critique points at problems in our societies of which we are 
well aware, it is still misplaced. Such regrettable problems are 
simply the unintended by-products of a free society. In other words, 
we are not responsible; we are not to blame. 
It appears quite clearly from this brief account that the debate is 
going on at different levels, and the debate also reveals basic 
differences in world-view. An important disagreement concerns the 
demarcation of the political sphere: the scope of the area considered 
to be the state's responsibility. In the Western political discourse, the 
area of concern has, to a great extent, been confined to a certain 
political sphere, basically defined by the professional activities of 
politicians and their institutions. "People" are of particular interest as 
voters, and the link between the strictly political sphere and the 
voters is the ballot. The division between politics - especially state 
affairs - and civil society is a liberal democratic virtue. The imper- 
sonal structure of public power based on laws is seen as a necessary 
measure to protect the rights of the i n d i ~ i d u a l . ~ ~  The experience of 
the former Soviet Union and the East European communist 
countries, where societies were politicized by means of ideological 
socialization, seems to prove the reasoning of the liberal view 
correct. 
In cross-cultural political studies, however, a generalization of this 
division constitutes a major problem, as it tends to remove politics 
from the historical, cultural and social contexts. Moreover, the 
practical bases from which political observers draw information and 
political actors derive their knowledge, have been limited to Western 
history and experience. That is why international debates on 
democracy have an overwhelmingly Western slant, which makes the 
Western position in these debates appear strong. It also seems to 
make the debates an almost impossible arena for those outside of the 
Western foundation. 
Democracy did develop in the West. Even though the original 
practice of democratic governing principles in the Greek city-states 
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centuries before Christ has little practical relevance for modern 
democracies, it does constitute a historical archetype. The signifi- 
cance of this classical model is that modern Western democratic 
developments can link up with the prototype, which then may 
constitute a source of inspiration. Western democracy thus sees itself 
rooted in the historical perspective of a glorious past, which gives 
political history a particular dimension, something like a notion of 
"the civilized" versus "the less civilized". We, the Westerners, are the 
true inheritors of the great fathers of democratic philosophy and 
practice. Because of this, we have the right to set the agenda and 
distinguish the genuine from the false - the undemocratic and 
uncivilized continuation of the Greek city-states and the far from 
democratic development in the rest of Europe notwithstanding. 
Despite the immanent Eurocentrism in reference to the classical 
model of democracy, it may be useful for quite another reason. The 
point of departure of contemporary debates between "universalists" 
and "relativists" concerning democracy is typically the Western 
liberalist version of that political system, seeing democracy as based 
on parliamentary institutions, economically matched to the free 
market system. Notwithstanding that this definition may be correct, 
it fails to elucidate the philosophical implication of liberalism, which 
is that the individual is considered the point of departure regarding 
society as well as politics. 
It is of utmost importance in East-West debates on democracy to 
keep in mind that liberalism is not democracy. It is actually in potential 
conflict with the spirit of democracy. While liberalism hails the 
freedom of the individual, democracy cherishes social responsibil- 
ity.26 Liberal democracy is a distinct, historically specific variety of 
democracy founded on ideas and practices developed in the Western 
world during the last 500 years. For one thing, it is linked to specific 
variations in the development of Christianity, in which the Protes- 
tant ethic, as Max Weber highlighted, provided a culture which 
emphasized individualism, hard work, economically rational con- 
duct and self-reliance. Here individualism is the crucial dimension. 
Recently, Francis Fukuyama explained the link between Christianity 
and individualism/liberalism as follows: 
Christianity provides the concept of a transcendent God whose 
Word is the highest source of right. God's laws take precedence over 
all other obligations - remember that God required Abraham to be 
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willing to sacrifice his son - and this transcendent source of morality 
is what enables an individual in the West to repudiate all forms of 
social obligation, from the family all the way up to the state. In 
modern liberalism, the Christian concept of a universal God is 
replaced with the concept of an underlying human nature that 
becomes the universal basis of rightOz7 
The Western European Christian culture, especially Protestantism in 
its Calvinist version, was not the sole cause of capitalistic deve- 
lopment, but it formed an environment where this development 
became rational and reasonable. This ideology was later introduced 
into economic theory, when Adam Smith, in the late seventeenth 
century, advocated free competition and free trade for the free citi- 
zen. The smooth interaction between the religious spirit and the 
material development gradually affected political theory and prac- 
tice. This is in brief the foundation of Western liberal democracy. 
Cultural Particularity as the Necessary Basis 
for True Democracy 
The contradiction between freedom of the individual and general 
social responsibility is an inherent theoretical and practical issue in 
all debates about democracy. The fact that democratization in non- 
Western areas gradually has evolved towards Western liberal 
patterns, is related to the political history of this century. After 1917, 
democracy in the West equalled freedom, while socialist comrnu- 
nalism came to be perceived as the opposite. This viewpoint was 
strengthened during the Cold War period between 1945 and the 
early 1990s. The collapse of Russian and East European state 
communism was taken as a proof of the superiority of the liberalist 
version of democracy, which is why the post-Cold War democratic 
wave appears to be the unfolding of liberalism worldwide. The 
Western human rights crusade rides on this wave, and liberal 
democracy has increasingly been amalgamated with human rights 
perspectives in the international debate. It is unquestionable that the 
moral integrity and legitimacy of human rights initiatives have been 
a strong supporting force for the international recognition of liberal 
democracy. It may, however, be a problem, that this link hardly 
performs as positively the other way around. 
40 The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 11 * 96 
Cultural Undercurrents in the Waves of Korean Democratization 
With the state-communist alternative in ruins, the field should 
now open up for a less biased discourse on democratization, addres- 
I sing ways rather than waves of democracy. To begin with, since prin- 
I ciples of individuality are culturally specific, liberalism as the cor- 
nerstone of a universal definition of democracy must ultimately be 
, rejected. In non-Western societies, and particularly in Asia, the ideal 
I family forms an indivisible organism. When ancestors and descen- 
I dants ideally form a living union, the individual becomes a highly 
complex conception. It is on the basis of this ideally constructed 
I 
notion that the individual is defined in communal terms, and that 
morality comes prior to liberty in non-Western s~cieties.~' 
Different definitions of the individual imply different definitions 
of freedom, equality, rights, property, justice, loyalty, power and 
authority.29 The particularity of these concepts gives rise to renewed 
considerations concerning political institutions such as elections, 
party pluralism, the separation of powers, and the impersonal, 
abstract state. This is not necessarily a contradiction of democracy, 
but it certainly challenges democracy as defined within the frame of 
liberalism. The division between state affairs and civil society has 
been mentioned above as a liberal democratic virtue. A structure of 
impersonal public power based on laws was seen as a measure to 
protect the rights of the individual. But in communally oriented 
societies, where it is conventional wisdom that the individual must 
submit to the interests of the community, such rights may easily be 
perceived as destructive. This may be valid for the local community 
as well as for the state, depending on the legitimacy - or rather moral 
standing - of the state in relation to the people. In advocating the 
right of non-Western countries to indigenize imported institutions, 
Bhikhu Parekh suggests, that: 
Rather than insist that the state must be autonomous and separate 
from society, and then set about finding ways of restoring it to the 
people, we might argue that it should not be separated from society 
in the first in~tance.~' 
There have been experiments with such indigenous models, but, 
according to Parekh, they have never been undertaken with any zeal 
or self-confidence, in part because Western governments and 
developmental experts labelled them as deviations from the true 
model. The indigenous attempts were thus, often even by those who 
tried to carry them out, perceived as backward, which is why they 
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were abandoned prematurely.31 The development in South Korea 
may be a case in point, 
Korean Independence, Modernization and Westernization? 
There have been several points of departure for liberal democracy in 
South Korea. Western liberal democracy, as a force of inspiration in 
the recent history of Korea, was evident in Christian missionary 
activities, which became closely connected to the development of a 
modern educational system modelled after American blueprints. The 
independence movement, active just before the turn of the century 
and during the colonial period, was another source bringing 
Western, liberal democratic ideals into Korea. The active role of a 
number of missionaries and Korean Christians in the independence 
movement strengthened the foothold of Christianity in Korea. This 
may be one of the reasons why this religion, from the advent of 
"Western learning" in the seventeenth century until today, has had a 
much stronger presence and importance in Korea than in neigh- 
bouring China and Japan. In relation to the post-liberation political 
development, Korean Christianity may have formed a supportive basis 
for initial attempts at realizing democracy. During the years of military 
authoritarian regimes (1961-87), some Christian churches were active 
centres for the struggle for democracy. And the major opposition figures 
in that period were well-known Christians, which is the case both for 
the incumbent president and the main opposition leader. 
To some extent, both Christian and democratic forces made 
progress in Korea because of what they achieved outside their fields. 
Both forces won favour because of their predominantly nationalistic, 
anti-Japanese position and their struggle for (Western) enlighten- 
ment and (Western) modernization, against communism. Neverthe- 
less Christianity remained alien to Korea, as did liberal democracy. It 
could not be otherwise. Despite all their merits, both Christianity 
and liberal democracy based their ideology on something incompre- 
hensible to most Koreans. The problem was individualism. In 
religious terms, individualism implied that every single person was 
responsible, in the final analysis, to God alone. In political terms, the 
individual was empowered vis-li-vis the government with a voting 
ballot, which he was supposed to use according to his sincere inner 
conviction. In both cases, the relationship with the supreme power, 
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mundane as well as celestial, was a matter of individual - but not of 
socio-personal - concern. The unit of primary religious as well as 
political concern was the individual (as defined in a Western context) 
and not the social person (as defined in a Korean context). Christianity 
in Korea has been transformed into a Korean Christianity, in which 
the social person has superseded the individual. The question is 
whether the same thing is going to happen with democracy? 
The fundamental contradiction between alien and indigenous 
views of man and society was recognized at an early stage in the 
post-war period, but disregarded for several reasons. The point of 
reference in this case was the US military government, present and 
in command between 1945 and 1948. They were hardly in a position 
to care about cultural differences. Ahn Byong-man et al. (1988) 
maintain that the occupation forces failed in their efforts to recruit 
popular support for a new political order. The US intervened in 
Korean politics to ensure their own interests. In so doing they 
showed a profound ignorance of the political and social forces then 
at work on the peninsula.32 After this difficult start came an even 
more troublesome continuation, in which war and the continuing 
division of the country made any kind of democratic practice 
virtually impossible. 
For years, liberal democracy was a formal facade for authoritarian 
regimes in South Korea. The perhaps most successful of these 
regimes, that of Major General Park Chung-hee (1961-79), did, 
however, attempt an encounter with liberal democracy. After 
coming to power in 1961 General Park made an interesting state- 
ment, asking what Korea had accomplished after liberation. His own 
position seemed clear: 
We have lost far more than we have gained! If we have gained 
anything; it is the compulsory transplantation of a blindly imitated, 
lame, imported democracy.33 
During this period moral education in the primary and secondary 
schools was upgraded. The intention was both to strengthen indi- 
genous values and norms and to inject a strong medicine against the 
threatening communist contamination from neighbouring North 
Korea. This double purpose may have weakened the project, as did 
the fact that Park's regime was a military government, and as such, 
unable to claim moral legitimacy. It seems likely, however, that 
moral education was developed in an attempt to revitalize the 
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Korean national spirit and produce a Koreanized democracy charac- 
terized by firm governmental guidance. 
It is commonly assumed that Park's attack on the "blindly imi- 
tated, lame, imported democracy" was a failure. This may be wrong. 
He did not succeed in establishing a lasting Korean version of 
democracy, but he may have planted the seed which at present is - 
or in the near future possibly will be - germinating. The seed was a 
subject in the curriculum: moral education. There are several reasons 
for this comparatively long period of hibernation. Obviously, 
political socialization in education cannot instantly bear fruit, but 
those who went through the educational system during the 1960s 
and early 1970s today form the coming generation of leaders in 
Korea. They are going to lead a country which is much stronger in 
economic terms, and thus much more confident also politically, than 
in any of the previous periods in modern Korean history. They are, 
moreover, going to lead a country where the communist threat is 
reduced, if not totally eliminated; where an acute national challenge 
is reunification; and where the terms for such a reunification ought 
to be found in traits commonly recognized both south and north of 
the 38th Parallel. And, last but not least, the coming leaders of Korea 
are in a position to base their considerations and planning on half a 
century of experience and experiments with attempts to implement a 
more or less liberal democratic model in a political culture that is 
strongly affected by indigenous values and norms. 
The incumbent government under President Kim Young-sam 
claims to have consolidated Korean democracy. It is a fact that the 
present government has successfully guided Korea politically 
through a transitional period which started in 1987, from a disguised 
military rule to a democratically elected civilian government. Now 
preparations are being made for a leap into the next millennium. The 
new challenge to be dealt with is called Segyehwa which refers to the 
emerging borderless world, or globalization.34 Even though it is 
acknowledged that the development in coming years must be based 
both on global and local considerations, the official globalization 
strategy of South Korea seems to emphasize the first more than the 
last. Furthermore the strategy follows in the footsteps of all earlier 
modernization forces and agencies of post-war Korean regimes by 
attacking the outdated traditionalism with its backward values and 
norms. Traditional values are seen basically in a negative light as 
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blocking a true global outlook. In an introduction to President Kim 
Young-sam's globalization policy, the author (Korean Overseas 
Information Service), states that the Administration "strives to have 
the Korean people readjust their social norms, attitudes, and ways of 
thought".35 The cure-all medicine that the official strategy prescribes 
is, in brief, the strengthening of individualism. 
This project has not worked for earlier regimes, and it is not likely 
that it will work for the present one. On the surface, on the top of the 
wave, something that looks like individualism may be visible. It can 
be a more individual trend in fashion, a more selective choice in 
consumption, and an even greater variety in political viewpoints. 
However, as table 3 revealed, basic values perceived to be indige- 
nous are thought of as highly relevant in the present society. These 
values seem to be forming an effective barrier against individualism. 
They form the undercurrent of Korean mentality. The explanatory 
power of these values must be tested in concrete cases, but it seems 
likely that both the tendency to prefer strong, moral leadership, and 
the prevalent regional division of political support can be explained - 
and possibly justified as well - through an understanding of 
indigenous values. Still, this ought to be investigated further in 
future studies of Korean democratization. When asked to relate to 
statements which reveal the contradiction between Eastern and 
Western ways, the respondents seem to have a fairly clear view. 
Table 4: Statements concerning generalized East-West perceptions 
(Response in % agreement) 
Statement 11990 11995 
The ideologies and lifestyle of the West, such as individualism and 
- 
materialism, threaten to destroy Korean society. 1 85 1 78 
The political influence of the US in Korea forms a hindrance to 
democracy. 
Korean democracy must take traditional culture as its point of 
departure. 
The core of political tradition in Korea comes from Confucianism. 
Despite the division and years of political enmity between the two 
halves of the country, there are more similarities than differences 
between people in South and North Korea. 
The North Koreans are by now as alien to us as the Japanese 
or Chinese people. 












Perceived Western ways, specified as individualism and material- 
ism, are strongly rejected by the respondents in table 4, and the 
negative judgement of the political effectsjof US presence in Korea 
points in the same direction. The subsequent two statements in table 
4 which stress the Korean way meet, on the contrary, a favourable 
response, even though there seems to be some reluctance to credit 
Confucianism as the core political tradition in the country. The last 
two statements in table 3 juxtapose people in the two halves of the 
divided country, to see how the Northern brothers are regarded after 
years of hostile relationship. It is interesting to note that the sense of 
unity still is strong, even if there seems to be a sense of growing 
alienation. 
The statements in table 4 are ideologically sensitive, and it might 
be wise not to overinterprete the responses. After all, it is easy, 
almost irresistible, to bash the US, hail "our" culture, and embrace 
the naughty brothers north of the border. It is all free of charge. The 
official publication on globalization mentioned above states that "a 
large majority of Korean people continue to be bound by nationalis- 
tic sentiments bordering on xenophobia".36 In relation to what was 
shown in tables 2 and 3, however, table 4 seems to fall into the 
category of indigenous values, ideas and opinions. Sound reserva- 
tions notwithstanding, table 4 may be an indication of a cultural- 
ideological climate more ripe for indigenous experiments than for 
the continuation of a far from unproblematic "liberal" democracy. 
In the West, we have been totally preoccupied with the spreading 
of political thinking and institutions that, according to our best 
knowledge, are of universal value. In the short post-Cold War 
period, liberal democracy has become a Western export commodity. 
By some potential recipient countries, the commodity has been 
perceived more as an ideological weapon, as a new offer from 
Westerners promoted with a missionary zeal. Our preoccupation 
with this project may be the reason why we seem to have been 
almost unaware of third-wave ~onfucianism.~~ 
Confucianism has by Korean intellectuals and adherents of a 
Western oriented modernization drive been perceived as a more or 
less conservative, even reactionary, political morality belonging to 
the traditional society. When adherents of so-called Asian-values 
democracy refer to Confucianism, it is met with little appreciation in 
the West. Confucianism could, on the other hand, be seen in the 
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same perspective as Christianity: as a moral-religious teaching with 
different interpretations and different effects in relation to the social, 
economic and political environment. In this case, "third-wave 
Confucianism" may be seen as certain Asian leaders' response to 
third-wave democracy, or simply as an Asian response to current 
I 
i developmental challenges. Some Asian leaders (but as yet not the Korean leadership), as well 
as a growing number of intellectuals (also in Korea), are well aware 
of the dangers connected with a total disapproval of indigenous 
values.38 Hall and Ames (1987) provide an eloquent formulation of 
this by stating that: "Where rationality is determined by immanent 
cultural norms, a wholesale repudiation of culture is a repudiation of 
normality."39 If we compare the liberalist individualism with its 
moral-philosophical foundation in the Christian belief system on the 
one hand with a farnilialistic collectivism based on indigenous 
Korean shamanism and Confucian social morality on the other, both 
may act as a basis for democracy, but it would hardly be the same 
kind of democracy. 
Culture involves roots. A host of intangible phenomena form the 
basis for man in his community: psychological, social, historical and 
others. In a world of migration, it becomes more and more clear that 
such roots should be perceived as a virtue, not a vice; as a strength, 
not a problem. One important undercurrent in Korean political 
culture is communalism. Half a century of modernization, of which 
the last twenty-five years' development has been incredibly rapid, 
has not uprooted communalism. This is one fundamental reason 
why liberalism as a democratic option in Korea seems to be failing. 
Another option might be a social democracy; in which the commu- 
nity is the starting point, and the individual is defined in terms of 
the community. A governing structure based on social and demo- 
cratic ideas, adjusted to a Korean environment, could be a communal 
structure, where the smallest entities were granted extensive self- 
rule. These communes could then elect delegates to larger adminis- 
trative entities all the way up to the national level. This "model" is 
close to a classical vision of post-liberal democracy. In David Held's 
words, "This arrangement is known as the "pyramid" structure of 
delegative democracy: all delegates are revocable, bound by the 
instructions of their constituency, and organized into a "pyramid" of 
directly elected comrnittee~".~~ Such a model could ensure represen- 
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tation and participation without undermining traditional structures 
of authority. It might be the most acceptable form of people's power 
in a context where the social person is the point of departure. 
A system based on regional representation would hardly be able 
to elect the supreme leader, however, and such a person seems to be 
very much in demand in Korea. The president could then be elected 
directly by secret ballot, as is the case today. A supreme leader elec- 
ted by popular vote with a regionally appointed council would 
perhaps meet the democratic expectations of the Korean people, and 
thus more genuinely reflect popular power in Korea. 
Such an arrangement would not greatly affect the globalization 
process, which certainly requires new initiatives on the political 
scene. But to envisage a global culture is probably a dead end. 
However, people who are well-equipped with their own culture, 
and aware of that of others, are hardly the worst actors on the global 
scene. The national and international initiatives called for at present 
are to prepare for a global civilization - a system that allows for, and 
even appreciates, variety; a system that establishes structures where 
all the many specific cases together make up a single whole. 
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